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Friday 3 June 2016

Now you see me… now you don’t!


By Kurt Johnson

Fraud in the financial services industry has been prevalent in recent years in Quebec. Think NorbourgMount RealEarl Jones…the not so illustrious list is a long one. And so is the line of investors queuing up to the Courts in the hopes of recouping at least some of their hard-earned savings, lost forever as one Ponzi scheme after the next seems to vapourize the nest eggs of unsuspecting investors.

But as quickly as those savings may disappear, so too may the insurance coverage investors are counting on when they hand their portfolios over to financial services representatives and firms duly registered with the Autorité des marches financiers (“AMF”).

 On May 16th, 2016, the Court of Appeal weighed in on what it qualified as a new question in this area: whether mandatory insurance contracted pursuant to the provisions of the Act respecting the Distribution of Financial Products and Services (“DFPSA”) can be annulled on the basis of misrepresentations or concealment of material facts.

The case of Brunet v. AXA Assurances Inc2016 QCCA 832[1]  presented a somewhat unique set of facts where the Appellants had the misfortune of dealing with a financial services representative, Themis Papadopoulos, who also happened to own 50% of the firm where the Appellants’ savings were being managed. As the directing mind of Triglobal Capital Management Inc. (“Triglobal”), Papadopoulos was responsible not only for managing the Appellants’ investments, but also for seeing to the renewal of Triglobal’s comprehensive liability insurance policy required under the mandatory provisions of the DFPSA and its regulations.

Like so many of the other cases of fleeced investors, the Appellants were lured into investing a significant portion of their portfolios into what turned out to be a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by none other than Papadopoulos. As news of the possible fraudulent scheme began to creep into the media, Papadopoulos was aggressively seeking the renewal of his firm’s mandatory insurance, at which time he misrepresented the affairs of Triglobal, and not surprisingly concealed information regarding the Ponzi scheme he himself had been running.

The policy was ultimately renewed, but less than six months later Papadopoulos’ scheme was fully revealed and Triglobal was eventually shut down by the regulators. The Appellants lost over two million dollars and sought indemnity under Triglobal’s recently renewed insurance policy. Not so fast, said AXA. Just as the Appellants had been duped by Papadopoulos, so too had the insurer. Hence, AXA invoked the nullity of its policy on the basis of Triglobal’s misrepresentations and concealment of material facts pursuant to Article 2410 CCQ.

The Superior Court agreed with AXA, and the Court of Appeal framed the question on appeal as follows:

[19] (…) Le juge de première instance a-t-il erré en droit en déclarant nul ab initio pour cause de fausses déclarations du preneur-assuré le contrat d’assurance requis en vertu de la Loi sur la distribution de produits et services financiers (la LDPSF)?

Relying on the public order nature of the DFPSA and its recognized purpose of consumer protection[1], the Appellants argued that allowing an insurer to retroactively invoke nullity of what is an otherwise mandatory insurance policy runs afoul the very logic and purpose of the legislative scheme. As such, the general insurance provisions of the CCQ, including notably Article 2410, must be read together in such a manner as to permit injured third persons access to the coverage.

While acknowledging the novelty of the question, the Court of Appeal took little time to dispose of Appellants’ argument, framing the issue as essentially one of statutory construction:

[23] L’assurance, on le sait, est un contrat qualifié d’uberrima fides (maxime latine que l’auteur Albert Mayrand traduit par « la plus abondante (grande) confiance »). Cette idée est codifiée par un article du Code civil du Québec compris dans les Dispositions générales du Chapitre XV consacré aux assurances. Il prévoit ce qui suit :

2410. Sous réserve des dispositions relatives à la déclaration de l'âge et du risque, les fausses déclarations et les réticences du preneur ou de l'assuré à révéler les circon­stances en cause entraînent, à la demande de l'assureur, la nullité du contrat, même en ce qui concerne les sinistres non rattachés au risque ainsi dénaturé.



2410. Subject to the provisions on statement of age and risk, any misrepresentation or concealment of material facts by either the client or the insured nullifies the contract at the instance of the insurer, even with respect to losses not connected with the risks so mis­rep­resented or concealed.

Or, rien dans les règles particulières qu’édictent LDPSF et du RCRASA n’écarte expressément, ni même implicitement, ce principe fondamental qui régit les relations entre assureur et assuré.

[24] Les appelants prétendent que l’article 80 de la LDPSF doit prévaloir sur l’article 2410 C.c.Q., mais cette disposition de la LDPSF ne saurait à elle-seule écarter le principe qu’énonce le Code civil du Québec (il faudrait un texte beaucoup plus spécifique pour parvenir à ce résultat). (…) [internal citations omitted].

Previous decisions of the Court have circled around a similar issue, notably the validity of certain exclusions under mandatory insurance policies issued pursuant to the DFPSA. And despite some contradiction and apparent tension between two of these decisions, the Court chose not elaborate on the issue. Instead, it simply reiterated that the insurance provisions of the CCQ trump the DFPSATo hold otherwise would require far more clear language:

[31] Par ailleurs, rien dans les récents arrêts Guillemette, Audet c. Transamerica Life Canada et Larrivée c. Murphy n’est susceptible d’appuyer la thèse des appelants sur l’interaction entre le Code civil du Québec d’une part, et d’autre part la LDPSF et le RCRASA. Ces textes doivent évidemment s’interpréter les uns avec les autres de manière à les rendre compatibles entre eux, mais il n’existe nulle part dans la législation et la réglementation sur les produits et les services financiers de règle susceptible de supplanter le principe de l’article 2410 C.c.Q., une pierre angulaire du droit des assurances. [internal citations omitted]

The result may very well leave investors in Quebec more nervous than ever. Because while they may think they are covered when dealing with a representative and firm licensed under the DFPSA, the CCQ may say otherwise. Now you’re covered…now you’re not!


[1] Souscripteurs du Lloyd’s v. Alimentation Denis & Mario Guillemette inc. 2012 QCCA 1376





[1] IMK acted in this file.

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