The Search for Truth… with the assistance of maps

By David Grossman

Preparing for trial can be difficult for witnesses. The nature of the legal system is such that trials will usually take place years after the events in question occurred, and witnesses’ memories are not frozen in time. Witnesses may meet with counsel to prepare, but testimony is not a prepared speech.

At the same time, testimony is not a closed book quiz either.

As a result, witnesses may sometimes bring notes with them to trial. Such notes are not prohibited, and could assist witnesses in recalling certain events. The drawbacks of bringing notes, however, are twofold: first, the fact the witness is relying on prepared notes may affect her credibility and the impression the judge has of her testimony; second, the notes themselves become fair game to opposing counsel.

Notes prepared in connection with trial are normally protected by litigation privilege, which creates a confidential space for litigants to prepare their cases without fear of discovery by the other side: see Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39. But when a witness makes use of them on the stand, that privilege is lost. The question then becomes where the line is drawn between privileged and unprivileged materials. Justice Suzanne Ouellet of the Superior Court of Québec was seized of this question in Boulaine v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 QCCS 6582.

A witness referred to notes in the context of a discovery examination. The notes referred to various paragraphs of the proceedings, but references to paragraph 15 of the motion to institute proceedings were removed. Opposing counsel wanted to obtain a copy of the removed comments in connection with paragraph 15.

Ouellet J.C.S. referred to the principle that notes used by a witness lose their privileged status, and opposing counsel gains the ability to cross-examine the witness on the notes. However, it is only the substance of the note that is covered by this rule. A witness who deliberately excludes certain subjects from her notes will not be said to renounce privilege on those subjects. The objection to disclosure of comments in connection with paragraph 15 was therefore maintained.

The holding in this case followed from the premise that the notes used by the witness were complete in themselves, as they were the only notes consulted by the witness. This situation can be contrasted with one where a party engages in incomplete or selective disclosure of privileged material, giving the Court an incomplete picture of events.

In Pop v. Boulanger, 2016 QCCS 2728, Justice Chantal Corriveau recently repeated the applicable principles in such a situation. Where there is renunciation, the renouncing party cannot unilaterally determine its scope in a manner advantageous to her. Citing the Supreme Court, Corriveau J. explained that where there is a renunciation, the Court has the obligation to ensure that “tous les documents pertinents” are revealed.

Corriveau J.C.S. also referred to a decision by Justice Joël Silcoff, confirming that a party cannot “cherry pick” which materials to disclose and which materials to exclude, in a manner that may give an incomplete picture to the Court. In that case, Silcoff J.C.S. held that a party cannot draw a line at a certain point-in-time and declare that privileged communications before that date are renounced, but privileged communications thereafter should remain protected. If the whole story includes communications that may have been exchanged subsequently, the Court will not adhere to the line that the renouncing party drew.

The takeaway from the foregoing is that the rules of disclosure and evidence are ultimately meant to support a system where truth and fairness prevail. A witness will not be prohibited from relying on notes, but equally, the witness will not be able to hide them from the opposing party. A witness can renounce privilege on some but not all documents, but equally, the witness will not be able to do so in a manner that tells only half the story.

So you can bring a map to court to help search for the truth. But you’ve got to be ready to share.

Corporations' right to counsel of their choice

By Maria Braker

A director has retained and worked closely with a lawyer on the corporation's behalf in the past. Can that fact be used to disqualify the same lawyer from representing the corporation in legal proceedings against the now former director?

No, answers the Court of Appeal in Corporation de services des ingénieurs du Québec/Réseau IQ v. Indelicato, 2016 QCCA 1087.

In 2005, Mr. Indelicato was the president of Réseau IQ. He retained the services of Me Grenier, on behalf of Réseau IQ, to draft and negotiate an employment contract with its then Director General. In 2009, Réseau IQ hired Mr. Indelicato as its new Director General, without the involvement of Me Grenier or other legal counsel. Nonetheless, the employment contract signed by Mr. Indelicato drew heavily on the one drafted by Me Grenier in 2005.

Following his dismissal in 2012, Mr. Indelicato sued Réseau IQ for insufficient notice of termination of employment. Réseau IQ retained the services of Me Grenier's firm to represent it in the proceedings.

Mr. Indelicato sought to disqualify Me Grenier from acting for Réseau IQ. He pleaded that he intended to testify about conversations he had with Me Grenier on the juridical effects of the 2005 contract, and, by extension, his own contract.

The first instance judge granted the Motion for Disqualification, holding that there was sufficient overlap between the pre-existing relationship between the two men and Me Grenier's mandate in the file. According to the first instance judge, Me Grenier should be disqualified since he was privy to confidential communications and since he would be likely called to testify at the trial.

The Court of Appeal disagrees with this reasoning.

Justice Mainville, with the agreement of justice Forget, reminds the reader that the right to be represented by one's counsel of choice should only be limited for compelling reasons. Here, finds the Court of Appeal, no such compelling reasons were presented.

Justice Mainville explains that the fact that Mr. Indelicato was Réseau IQ 's mandatary does not entail that Mr. Indelicato became Me Grenier’s client. The client was Réseau IQ, acting, as all corporations do, through its representative. That legal opinions were transmitted to Réseau IQ by the intermediary of Mr. Indelicato does nothing to alter the effects of professional secrecy in this case.

Because Mr. Indelicato was Réseau IQ's mandatary, he was bound by a duty of confidentiality. However, this duty of confidentiality does not confer immunity from judicial disclosure.

On the other hand, professional secrecy, as protected by s. 9 of the Quebec Charter, does confer immunity from judicial disclosure. In matters of the professional secrecy of lawyers, the immunity from judicial disclosure extends not only to the lawyer but also to those who receive his or her opinions as the client’s mandatary, here, Mr. Indelicato.

Therefore, neither Me Grenier nor Mr. Indelicato could testify to the legal opinions provided by Me Grenier unless Réseau IQ waived professional secrecy. With no indication that such a waiver would be given, there were no compelling reasons to disqualify Me Grenier.

Justice Bélanger would also have dismissed the appeal, based on the fact that the integrity of the trial did not appear to be threatened by the debate as presented.

This decision serves as a useful illustration of the oft-repeated principle that the right to professional secrecy belongs to the client. This is true even when, as is the case here, the client is a corporation acting through a representative whose interests later diverge from its own. 

PRIVILÈGE RELATIF AU LITIGE : la Cour d’appel rappelle les principes

Par Sophie Perron

Suite à l’entrée en vigueur du nouveau Code de procédure civile, l’objection fondée sur le privilège relatif au litige fait partie des objections qui continuent d’être tranchées aussitôt que possible après qu’elles aient été soulevées (articles 228 et 297 C.p.c.).  Le 5 février dernier, la Cour d’appel du Québec a rappelé les principes et le fardeau de preuve de celui qui s’objecte sur cette base dans l’affaire Compagnie d’assurances AIG du Canada c. Solmax International (2016 QCCA 258).

Dans ce dossier,  dans un arrêt unanime des juges Doyon, Savard et Mainville, j.c.a., la Cour d’appel du Québec rejette l’appel et rejette l’objection de Compagnie d’Assurances AIG du Canada (« AIG »).

AIG s’était objectée à transmettre « les échanges entre son service des réclamations et celui de la souscription relativement à la couverture et /ou au refus de la couverture de la réclamation de Solmax International Inc. ».

La Cour d’appel rappelle d’abord l’objectif du privilège relatif au litige : 

[3] Le privilège relatif au litige a pour objectif d’assurer l’efficacité du processus contradictoire et vise à créer une « zone de confidentialité » permettant aux parties de préparer en toute liberté leurs arguments, comme le souligne la Cour suprême dans Blank c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice)[1]. En l’espèce, les échanges auxquels donne lieu cette préparation ne seront privilégiés « que si le but principal ou substantiel de [leur] création a été d'aider une partie en vue d'un litige »[2], existant ou à venir.

Elle revoit ensuite le critère qui doit être rencontré à savoir que la préparation du litige doit être l’objet principal de la communication ou du document :

[4] Dans Blank c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), la Cour suprême fait état de trois types de documents dans ce domaine : ceux dont un objet important est la préparation du litige, ceux dont c’est l’objet principal et ceux dont c’est l’unique objet. Elle retient le critère de l’objet principal, par opposition à celui de l’objet important. Cela permet de conférer une protection compatible avec les caractéristiques du privilège, qui constitue une exception limitée au principe de la communication complète de la preuve[3]. En conséquence, ceux dont la préparation du litige n’est qu’un des objets, sans être l’objet principal, ne peuvent se voir conférer le statut de documents protégés.

Finalement, la Cour d’appel souligne qu’il revient à la partie qui invoque le privilège relatif au litige de démontrer que l’objet principal du document est la préparation du litige :

[5] Somme toute, la condition essentielle à l’applicabilité du privilège relatif au litige est que le document ait pour objet principal la préparation du litige et c’est à la partie qui invoque le privilège de démontrer que ce critère est satisfait[4]. En ce sens, le privilège relatif au litige doit être interprété restrictivement, contrairement au secret professionnel dont l’interprétation large est favorisée.

[6] En l’espèce, à ce stade des procédures et selon la preuve considérée par le juge de première instance, l’appelante n’a pas établi que le but principal des échanges entre ses deux services était la préparation du litige. Il s’agissait principalement de l’aider à décider si la réclamation devait être acceptée. Même s’il est possible que ces échanges soient aussi utiles à l’appelante dans le cadre du litige, cela n’en fait pas l’objet principal, même si ce peut être un objet important.

Cet arrêt succinct constitue du même coup un excellent aide-mémoire pour tout avocat comptant s’objecter à la communication d’un document sur la base du privilège relatif au litige.

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[1]  Blank c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), [2006] 2 R.C.S. 319, 2006 CSC 39, paragr. 27 et 34.

[2] Jean-Claude Royer et Sophie Lavallée, La preuve civile, 4^e éd., Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008, paragr. 1149.

[3] Blank c. Cananda, paragr. 59 et 60.

[4] Marie-Josée Hogue et Berly Lelièvre-Acosta, « Secret professionnel et communications privilégiées », dans JurisClasseur Québec, coll. « Droit civil », Preuve et prescription, fasc. 11, Montréal, LexisNexis Canada, feuilles mobiles, paragr. 25.